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FOREWORD
JENNIFER TAUB *
Legal reformers of all stripes will find plenty to ponder in Volume
43 of the Western New England Law Review. The very relatable topics
include emotional support animals, distribution rights for small beer
brewers, fairness in accident insurance coverage, alternative legal
education materials, and custody challenges for parents with abusive
partners. Drawing from diverse subject matter, what each article shares
in common is the identification of a perceived problem with the legal
status quo and a presentation of proposed solutions. By highlighting and
briefly engaging with the central points raised in this collection of articles,
I hope to entice readers to learn and reflect more on these emerging issues.
With Inclusion of Emotional Support Animals as Service Animals
Under the ADA: Creating the Right to Use Dogs to Assist People Living
with Mental Health Issues,1 Amanda M. Foster identifies a gap in existing
federal law that if addressed could benefit the lives of millions of
Americans. In this compelling article, Foster calls for a broadening of the
definition of “service animal” under regulations implementing the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) to embrace animals that offer
genuine emotional support to their human companions. This could allow
those with emotional support animals access to places of public
accommodation. Foster’s recommendations would support millions of
Americans who experience serious mental health issues and could benefit
from bringing an emotional support animal into public spaces for ordinary
daily social activity including college campuses, restaurants, and
transportation centers. Foster balances the perceived benefit of an

* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.
1. Amanda M. Foster, Inclusion of Emotional Support Animals as Service Animals Under
the ADA: Creating the Right to Use Dogs to Assist People Living with Mental Health Issues, 43
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 7 (2021).
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expanded definition of “service animal” for ADA compliance purposes
with concern for people who may have allergies or other aversions to such
animals could be harmed from encounters with them.
This article educates as much as it advocates for change. Readers
learn about a patchwork of laws that create confusion and uncertainty.
Airlines permit passengers to travel with certain emotional support
animals, and some colleges also permit emotional support animals to
reside with students in dormitories. However, when the same people
attempt to bring their emotional support animals along for daily activities,
due to insufficient and inconsistent laws, they are often denied access to
other spaces. Foster contends that both an expanded definition of service
animal by the FDA and more clarity at the federal, state, and local level
would help reduce the stigma associated with mental illness.
Under existing ADA regulations, because emotional support animals
“do not have special training to perform tasks that assist people with
disabilities,” they are not covered as service animals. However, as the
article details, other federal legal regimes recognize a more expansive
definition of service animal, such as the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Air
Carrier Access Act (ACAA).
We enter the world of small brewing businesses in Frederickie A.
Rizos’ Brewing a Solution: An Argument for Fairness in Massachusetts
Beer Franchise Laws.2 In this article, Rizos focuses on the limitations of
a state law designed years ago to protect relatively weaker distributors
from far more powerful beer manufacturers. When applied to small,
unsophisticated craft brewers, it is the large distributors who have the
upper hand and the beer producer who struggles to get by. This was
designed to prevent a powerful, often out-of-state manufacturer from
squeezing a weaker distributor into bad contract terms or no deal at all.
Enacted in 1971, the Massachusetts Beer Franchise Law generally
forbids a brewer from terminating a relationship to sell a particular brand
of beer if that relationship has lasted at least six months with a distributor.
Even if the agreement is not in writing, the brewer must continue to supply
the distributor with that same product. The problem arises for craft
brewers using a distributor who expends little effort to get the beer brand
into retail establishments. Only after providing six-month’s notice and
then proving in court that there is “good cause” to end the relationship,
something that is expensive and time-consuming, can the brewer
terminate the distribution agreement. In theory, a brewer could simply
2. Frederickie A. Rizos, Brewing a Solution: An Argument for Fairness in Massachusetts
Beer Franchise Laws, 43 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 47 (2021).
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find another distributor who could sell the beer in that same geographical
area. However, in practice, many small brewers enter exclusivity
arrangements promising a distributor they will be the only one to sell the
beer to retailers in a particular location. Given that type of arrangement,
the brewer could be stuck with that lackluster distributor and only that
distributor indefinitely, according to the article.
Rizos recommends that Massachusetts follow Maine, Maryland, and
North Carolina in crafting a legislative solution to address the way the
market is actually structured today. In addition, she offers good advice
for what small brewers should be wary of when entering into distribution
arrangements in the meanwhile.
Two separate articles about unfairness in outcomes under
Connecticut insurance and tort law pair well in this issue. In The Sudden
Medical Emergency Defense in Connecticut: Insurers Benefit While the
Innocent Insured is Left to Suffer,3 Caitrin Ellen Kiley highlights a
tremendous injustice affecting people injured in car accidents. And, in
Collateral Source Reductions in Connecticut: How Insurance “WriteOffs” Now Lead to Windfall Judgments – An Analysis of the Marciano
Decision and its Impact,4 Frank J. Garofalo III reveals how accident
victims can collect financial windfalls at the expense of defendants.
Kiley’s article describes the hardship faced by a person injured in a
car accident who seeks redress under Connecticut case law. Because
Connecticut still relies on a tort liability scheme for automobile accidents,
those in an automobile who suffers injuries and other damage must sue
the driver of the other automobile in order to recover under tort law. Many
other states have a type of no-fault system where each party seeks
compensation from the insurance provider of the driver in whose auto they
were traveling, regardless of who was “at fault.” In contrast, to recover,
an injured party in Connecticut must sue the driver they believed caused
the accident. The problem Kiley identifies arises when the insurance
company of the defendant driver who caused the accident successfully
establishes a medical emergency defense, a doctrine that is often
confusing as applied and has not been addressed by the Connecticut
Supreme Court for nearly a century. In such a situation, the driver and
any passengers in the “innocent” car have no recourse. The innocent car

3. Caitrin E. Kiley, The Sudden Medical Emergency Defense in Connecticut: Insurers
Benefit While the Innocent Insured is Left to Suffer, 43 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 78 (2021).
4. Frank J. Garofalo III, Collateral Source Reductions in Connecticut: How Insurance
“Write-Offs” Now Lead to Windfall Judgments – An Analysis of the Marciano Decision and its
Impact, 43 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 144 (2021).
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insurer will not cover the injuries or damages; and those in the innocent
car are even barred from recovering via the uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverage.
Kiley wisely recommends ending this unfairness through statute or
regulation that would allow someone injured due to another driver’s
sudden medical emergency to recover from that driver’s insurance policy.
As she points out, Connecticut years ago enacted legislation to protect
innocent plaintiffs in car accident cases where the defendants are
uninsured or underinsured. It seems irrational not to also protect innocent
plaintiffs from being left to pay for their own injuries when the driver who
caused the accident had a medical emergency.
In the companion article, Garofalo a former in-house attorney for an
insurance company, shows how Connecticut courts can unjustly allow
personal injury victims to collect in compensatory damages more than
what they had to pay out of pocket because of their injuries. First, he sets
out an example where the system works properly to reduce a plaintiff’s
recovery from the person who injured them when that plaintiff has another
source of reimbursement. In this fair situation, the plaintiff is awarded
$100,000 in damages of which $50,000 is meant to cover economic
damages (in this case, medical expenses). If the plaintiff had paid $20,000
in premiums for insurance coverage, and the insurance company paid the
full $50,000 in medical expenses, this would mean, the insurance
company covered $30,000 net. Thus, under Connecticut statute, to avoid
a windfall, in a post-trial hearing, the judge would reduce the recovery to
just $70,000. This reduction is pursuant to what’s called the “collateral
source” rule. While that seems equitable, a different result can ensue if
the insurance company only paid $35,000 of those medical expenses, but
the medical provider wrote off the remaining $15,000, so that the plaintiff
had no obligation. In such a situation because under federal law the
medical provider could be entitled to reimbursement for that loss, through
what’s known as subrogation, Connecticut courts would not apply the
“collateral source” rule. As a result, instead of reducing the award at all,
the court could allow the full $100,000 be paid by the defendant to the
plaintiff. This is due to a 2016 court decision that forbids any collateral
source reduction when any right of subrogation exists. The simple
legislative fix would be to make clear that only the exact amount subject
to a right subrogation would be exempted. If such a rule were in place, in
the second scenario above, the award would be reduced to $85,000. This
is a fairer outcome, the author contends.
In Open Your Casebooks Please: Identifying Open Access
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Alternatives to Langdell’s Legacy,5 Emma Wood and Misty Peltz-Steele
encourage law professors to stop relying on traditional, expensive
casebooks and instead compile their own digital course materials. The
authors recommend these customized course materials be comprised of
content not subject to copyright protection, such as excerpts from judicial
opinions made available by the court, or material that is subject to an opensource license. Barriers to law professors moving in this direction, they
believe, are both lack of knowledge and incentives.
Central to the authors’ argument is that “the primary sources used to
teach law are available for free.” Before adopting this approach, it is
worth considering bar passage, perhaps a topic for a follow-on paper. Law
professors who are motivated to create their own course materials for bar
subjects are reasonably wary of doing so without sufficient data about
correlations. We have many goals for our students including trained for
bar passage, practice-readiness, and in possession of sufficient
knowledge, legal writing training, and analytical tools to adjust and adapt
as client’s needs and the law evolves.
The final article in the collection focuses on child custody and
domestic violence. In The Revictimization of Survivors of Domestic
Violence and their Children: The Heartbreaking Unintended
Consequence of Separating Children from their Abused Parent,6 coauthors Jeanne M. Kaiser and Caroline M. Foley, document how courts in
Massachusetts fail to fully and fairly assess the threat to children before
removing them from a parent who is the victim, not the perpetrator of
domestic violence. There is a tragic anomaly in existing law. While
courts must provide “detailed and specific findings” about the impact of
domestic violence on a child before placing a child in the home of an
abuser, they are not expected to be that careful before removing a child
from a victim. What this means in practice is that courts can remove
children from a mother who is caught up in a cycle of domestic violence
and even sever parental rights without actual evidence presented that the
particular children are being neglected or psychologically harmed.
Further, they contend that “[t]he result of this practice [of non-factspecific removals] can prove more damaging to children than the effect of
witnessing the abuse.” By way of example, they described a five-year-old

5. Emma Wood & Misty Peltz-Steele, Open Your Casebooks Please: Identifying Open
Access Alternatives to Langdell’s, 43 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 103 (2021).
6. Jeanne M. Kaiser & Caroline M. Foley, The Revictimization of Survivors of Domestic
Violence and their Children: The Heartbreaking Unintended Consequence of Separating
Children from their Abused Parent, 43 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 168 (2021).
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who was seeking to be reunited with her mother, who had been separated
from her because the mom had previously been in abusive relationships
that her older children had witnessed. She spent years living a series of
foster homes, separated from her siblings. The trial court judge refused to
return the girl to her mom, even though the mother was in therapy and
participated in domestic violence training, and even though she had a
strong bond with her mom, and even though the DCF-required
psychologist testified at trial that it was unlikely the mom would expose
her daughter to domestic abuse. The appellate court affirmed. As the
authors note, neither court “considered the fact that there was no evidence
that exposure to domestic abuse had ever had an adverse effect on” the
child.
The authors argue that courts should be required to provide the same
level of “detailed and specific findings” that they would before placing a
child with an abuser. In their words, “[t]he trial court should be required
to make findings about the effect of domestic violence on this particular
child whose welfare is at issue.”
In conclusion, I hope you enjoy the rich and thoughtful selection of
articles and I thank the staff for inviting me to read and comment on them
in this issue of the Western New England Law Review.

